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1« Introduction
The terra ,,status politics" refers to a way of conceptualizing some aspects 
o£ political behavior, which st present enjoys a certain vogue among sociologists 
and political scientists״ Briefly stated ,this theory says that people vote the 
way they do, support certain organizations or political figures or express beliefs 
about and attitudes toward other groups or people because they are trying either 
to improve some rank(s) or defend some rank advanfcage(s) they see themselves as 
having over groups or people. ,,Rank*' in this context refers to positively evalu״ 
ated characteristics (achieved or ascribed) which people can possess to a greater or 
less extent. Education, Income, Authority (relative to some group), Seniority 
(in some work group for instance), Ethnicity (in some societies) are examples of ranks
Xn this paper we shall examine some of the research using the status poli­
tics conception in order to clarify some of the theoretical problems that arise 
when we try to use these conceptions in a systematic and consistent fashion. <0ur 
approach is quite critical, partly because the present paper has been written 
originally as a working paper parallel with a theoretical paper formulating a 
systematic theory of ranking processes (Zelditeh and Anderson , 1963). We 
believe that a formal theory of considerable explanatory power can eventually 
be developed to account forphenc®aaeon *e have called rank equilibration and 
which other people have called "status congruence" or "status crystallization".
This theory will then include status politics as a special case.
The basic idea in this theory can be briefly sketched as follows. We 
assume that r ^ „r״ are ranks in a given social system which includes two 
people A and B. A is consistently high on all his ranks, while B is high on some 
and loy on others„ Mow, under aotae conditions, if B compares himself with A, a
* He are much indebted to Adem Haber, Reward S. Becker, Christian Bay and Patricia 
Richmond for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.
state of imbalance occurs. B «ay, for instance notice that although ho has the 
sauie education as A, his income is considerably lower״ He then feels relatively 
deprived. A comparing himself with B may feel guilty about the same situation«
?׳,?, is asamaed that people, when confronted in comparison situations with states 
of imbalance occurring will often try, if possible, to aet in such a wav as to 
eliminate the imbalance}
The theory, then, has to specify the conditions under which discovered 
Inconsistencies actually will lead to imbalance and also with what the Indivi­
duals concerned will try to do about it under varying conditions. We shall not furt 
discuss these problems right here. Instead we will introduce some preliminary 
considerations as we discuss concrete material in the paper.
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* An important illustration is Homans' study of clerical workers. (Homans, 1962) 
His ledger clerks feel relatively deprived when they compare, themselves with 
the cashposters. The ledger clerks point out that they actually have more 
responsibility and seniority but get the sast» pay as the cash posters־ The 
conditions under which imbalance does r.ot occur includes role differentiation.
A welder in a plant, for instance, does not normally expect a manager to get 
less pay than himself although the manager usually is less competent at 
welding. This and other conditions are discussed in the theory paper.
2 . The Lenski Approach
Gerhard Lenski has pioneered the empirical work on rank equilibration,
wising data from survey data from the Detroit area« (Lenski, 1954). He
worked with the foil ׳־,wing four rank dimensions: Occupational Prestige, (csing
the HORC rankings), Xncome, Education ar<.d the Prestige of Sthnic Group, (How the
subjects were placed in each of these variables is described in lenski, 1954״
406 f.) Comparing the ranks of different respondents on each one of these rank
dimensions it is found that many individuals consistently have either high or
medium or low ranks on all, four dimensions, but also that there are individuals
who do not consistently have the same rank on the four dimensions« Somebody
will for instance have & low ethnic rank, but occupy a prestigeful occupation,
have a higher than average income and be college graduate״ Somebody else has
a low income in spite of having more than average education, occupational standing
or ethnicity. U3ing a statistical procedure״ Lenski divides his sample into
two groups: (Lenski, 1954, 407 f) the highly cryataliaed who, by and large,
occupy similar ranks on si! four dimensions aud the low crystal!zed. By dropping
out seme cas»s he sees ft® it Chat the high crystalised group has a somewhat lower
average score on the four rank dimensions than the low crystalised group Using
vote for the Democratic party and responses to some ©pinion items as indicators
of "welfare liberalism"״ Lenski then shows that in his data the low crystalised
on socio-economic issues 
group tends to be on the average more liberal/than the highly crystalized one„
Democratic vote and liberal attitudes are taken as indicators of a desire 
for social change. Lenski*s Interpretations of his findings can most easily be 
understood ii we consider a person with a low ethnic rank. S « h  a person may 
feel that others do not treat him with the respect he thinks is due to him
because of his high occupation, income and education, Getting rebuffad creates 
resentment in him. He may therefore desire to change the social structure in 
such a way that his ethnic group gets more resrjet. A minority rights liberal 
attitude results. This attitude may, presumably, become generalized to a 
concern for the rights of underdogs in general.
Xrwiu Goffman, a student of Lenski’s tried to get a more direct measure 
of this desire for change by asking respondents to rank five power groups (State 
Governments, Big Business, Labor Onions, Businesses that are not large and the 
National ©sjverroaent ) with respect to; (1) How much power they actually do 
wield in American society and (2) with respect to how much power they ought to 
have. The discrepancy between these two ratings, measured by Kendall's fcau״ 
coefficient, represents the magnitude of desired change in the power aspect of 
the social structure. (Goffman, 1957). Coffman's findings point in the same 
direction as Lenski's־
Lenski's study was replicated in detail by R. Sokel and G. Brennemeyer 
using data from Winchester, Mass. and San Francisco, respectively״ Their studies 
did not show the low crystalised to be more liberal than other, however.
Is Lenski's theory then false? We do not think eot Some theoretical considerations 
suggest that rank inconsistency under certain conditions will create a desire 
in people to change those aspects of social structure seen as responsible for the 
inconsistency. So we may suspect that the contradictory results found in the 
studies by Lenski, Sokel and Brennemeyer are due to an inadequete conceptualisation 
of the problem
We propose to show that: (a) rank inconsistency may or may not have 
political consequences and (b) if rank inconsistency has political consequences for 
a person, the response chosen may be a right-wing or a left-wing one, depending
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on the circumstances» Thus, there are no theoretical reasons why we should 
find that rank inconeistents as a group are more liberal than others. Let us 
consider a number of different cases of rank inconsistency.
Consider first a situation in which Ego has Low Education but a High 
Income and Alter has both High Education and High Income. No effects are 
going to result unless some comparison process between Ego and Alter occurs, 
Assure that Ego compares his ranks with those of Alter. Ego may feel that 
given the investment in Education he has made he i3 doing well, since he makes 
as much money as Alter who has invested more in education. This situation 
may, then, lead to a feeling of relative satisfaction on Ego's part. There­
fore, Ego may feel satisfied with the social order and will not attempt to
|
change it־, It is conceivable, however, that Ego will feel sorry for Alter if 
he thinks that Alter by no fault of his ov?n has not gotten the rewards that his 
education would normally entitle him to. It is not easy to predict if this 
compassion will affect Ego's feelings about the social order, though.
Let us now assume that Ego and Alter have the same income, but that Ego 
has lower Ethnic rank than Alter.




We first consider the situation from Ego's point of view. We make the 
following assumption as part of what it means that Ego's Ethnic rank is lower 
than that of Alter:
Assumption; (Partial definition of "Ego has lower Ethnic rank than Alter")
If Ego tries to engage in diffusa social interaction with 
Alter then Alter will rebuff Ego with probability p, p >  «50.
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If Ego compares himself with Alter he will focus attention on either the 
first or the second of his -ranks. Focusing on the first, he may reason that 
"for a (Jew, Negro..״) I’m doing quite well, since I make as much as Alter." But 
focusing cn his second rank he will say: ,'I snake as much money as Alter but Alter 
still i־?on!t accept me socially because I'a a (Jew, Negro....)" The first choice 
is likely to lead to a feeling of relative satisfaction. The second, on the ocher 
band. will lead to a feeling of relative deprivation, (provided that Ego feels 
that his Ethnic group should be treated as equal to that of Alter),
What consequences does relative deprivation have in such a case?
A, Ego can cease comparing himself with Alter and people like Alter and 
instead interact solely with other members of his own Ethnic group. This response 
we terra "insulation." In this way ethnicity eventually ceases to be a differen­
tiating characteristic, since everybody Ego compares hirr.seIf with has the same 
Ethnic rank.
Bo Ego can persist trying to interact diffusely with Alter and comparing 
himself with Alter* and in the course of this '8atrophy" his Ethnic status. This 
is a form of individual mobility called ',passing ’.
C. Ego can engage in activities designed to change the social evaluation 
given his Ethnic Group. This may lead him to participation in organized groups 
with such goals, such as the Anti •*defamation League or the HAACP. In the course 
of this, he may persist trying to interact with Alter to soma extent in order to 
try to change Alter's behavior toward lower ethnic groups.
Responses A and C can, of course, occur in conjunction, but both appear to 
be incompatible with 3. There may be sonie question about how appropriate it is 
to apeak of the situation as one involving a choice between A, 3 and C. Instead 
of saying that "Ego chooses between A, B and C *e might say that "one and only 
one of A, B and £ will occur„" We speak of a choice because we believe that
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at leasr s״>ai6times the individual makes a conscious andctelibecat.g decision 
abovt which alternative to select.
All three responses may or stay no¿ lead to political manifestations־ A 
pere&n v?ho chooses to insulate may acquire power »!.thin his ethnic group, and may 
be able to influence the voting power of that group to further certain group 
interests. This, no doubt, presupposes that the ethnic group is an organized 
cosmxmity, to some- degree capable of united political action, and not oerely a 
statistical aggregate of individuals scattered all over the social system. Some 
American Jewish communities seem to have this characteristic. (See, for instance,
H. Wentz, 195 , and Kramer and Leventmann, 195 )־ The "passer" raay decide to 
embrace the traditionally conservative Republican^ political views of the higher 
ranking group he is trying to pass into, in order to appea*"ra8psctakle,״ or he 
may withdraw entirely from political comaiitBient. The civil rights combattant 
is likely to engage in political action to attain his goals. He may become con 
cerned with the rights of other ethnic and npn-־etimic underdogs as well, but the 
conditions for this generalization of attitudes to take place are not tall understood
Let os now look at the situation from Alter ,s point of view.. Alter may
reason either that (1) "I don't make any more noney than he does but at least 
I'm„־»{high status Ethnic group)...", or <2) "How come that.־־(low Ethnic group) saakfc. 
©s much money as X do?" Choice (1) leads to relative satisfaction, and choice 
(2) to relative deprivation־ Regardless of which choice he nakes, there is & 
possibility he will react to the comparison by reasserting his Ethnic rank„ If, 
for instance, general community rank contains the weighted components Income„ 
Ethnicity,.... ־,then Alter will try to increase the weight with which Ethnic rank, 
enters into community rank־ In politics this ta&y create sentiments of "natlvlsm," 
and antisemitism and xenophobia may be manifestations of this,. If choice (2) is 
made initially in the comparison, then reassertion of Ethnic rank may lead to
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peg® 8
hostility toward Ego in arder to show hi® *׳his place,” (Hostility directed toward 
Bgo leads to social rebuff of Ego, and we have just sean that this nay have 
affected how Ego responds after comparing himself Kith Alter).
ínvolV.ed in this cese is the ,,structural"1 fact that Alter cannot let Eg? 
improve his ethnic rank without Ego losing sosae of his. A person of ®ainly Angfe 
Saxon descent in the U.S., for instance, has high ethnic rank only because Negroes. 
Jews end others have lew. So if ethnic rank ¡matters much to Alter (end it will 
matter a lot for some persons whose only high rank is the ethnic one) then attempts 
by Ego to raise his may become a serious threat to Alter, this results in resent­
ment and "rank saving" behavior, including prejudice and hostility. The only way 
in which Eg© can change his ethnic rank without conflict with Alter is if ethnicity 
ceases to be a differentially evaluated characteristic„ People may of course still 
be proud of their ethnic identity, but they no longer use it as a basis for invidious 
comparisons. This seems to considerable extent to be happening in America at present 
Empirical findings showing that lower class people are more in favor of discrimination 
against Negroes than higher class people is certainly consistent with the rank
saving hypothesis. However, it is hard to tell whether reported prejudice is due
lack of
to attempts to save rank rather than some other factor, for instanca/education. A 
well educated person is trore likely than a less educated one to know that some of 
the beliefs underlying racial prejudice are in fact unfounded and way therefore find 
it impossible to hold soma prejudiced opinions even though such opinions would be 
convenient as rank saving devices. A careful motivational analysis is required 
before we can impute rank 3a.ving as a motive behind higotted opinions and behavior.
There are some- data bearing on rank raasssrtion; Robest Sokel has studied the 
combination (High Ethnicity/Low Income or Occupation) and found that such people 
tend to support McCarthy!am and to be more Conservative in their politics than 
lower income and occupation people in general are״ The historian Richard Hofstsdter
has used similar arguments to explain the rise of the¡ Kin Klux Klan as a rea­
ssertion or rural Asglo־>Saxes Protestants of their Ethnic rank in opposition to 
the mare recently arrived Ethnic Groups tfiefsfeedter, 1955, 291 M ) .  A nuiaber of 
papers in a volume on "The Net? American Right" made the same point about McCarthy!!¡® 
(Sell et. al., 1956)« Consider now a situation in which Ego and Alter compare 
themselves with one another־ Assume that Ego has a white collar job, and makes 
$6,000 a year־, Alter, wa assume:, has a blue collar job and makes the sams 
amount of iiKmey.
Income Occupational Group
Eg© $6000״ White Collar
Alter $6,000 Working Class
Again, when Ego compares hisseli with Alter he may focus attention on either 
of his two ranks. He say say that (1) "Alter may make as much money as S make, 
but 1 have a better job" or (2) !־Why if £ have a better job (with more prestige) 
don't 1 caake more money than he does?" Choice (2) is clearly more likely to make
him feel relatively deprived than choice (1),
Assume now that Ego has in face chosen the second response־ Whether or not 
he in fact gets seriously upset depends on at least one factor; namely, what he
expects his future earnings to be» If ego is 21 years old and just out of college 
and expects to rise gradually into higher income brackets he may not feel ve*y
deprived, especially if Alter is middle-aged and not likely to change his income 
upward in the future» On the other hand, if both Ego and Alter are iniddla°aged 
and if the relation between their earnings is not likely to change in the future, 
then 2go may coose to feel that he makes unjustly less than he ought to in comparison 
with Alter» We can capture his difference in outcome in the proposition that if 
Ego finds his rank inconsistent in comparison with Alter he will get upset to the 
extent that he perceives that upward mobility, in his lower raok(s) is blocked»
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Xf the situation is perceived to be transient then Ego is net likely to get upset״
Let us now assucs that Ego does in fact get upset when ha compare! his ranks
with those of Alter, Thtfn there are in fact several possible reactions that can
occur, a Ego may blamft the unfavorable comparison in income on "monopolistic
practices of the unions," and conclude that right=te-work legislation is called
for„ 2n pursuing this line of thought he may also expose himself №  other political
views propagated by advocates of right»to-work laws, and he may again through some
generalization process, come to take o more or less general radical rightist view
of political questions־.* b ־ Ego raay decide that the workman is better off
economically because of his union, and conclude that a strong white collar union
is called for to look after the interests of Ego's o*.m group. He may thus develop
"radical"
a very pro-union attitude and may also expose himself to othex/ influences as well„ 
Which factors will influence Ego's reactions in this situation? Vis kns?w
very little about this question, but one "structural factor5' seems certain to 
influecne Ego's choices Respor-ae b can occur only if a substantial proportion of 
the people who are in the same occupational class as Ego are willing to join a 
union The conditions for this to happen are not very well understood (when 
identified they will fora! the basis for a theory of the emergence of social ooveatants 
but according to our theory individual mobility expectations play an important role.
*Lockwood reports some British data on the attitudes of the clerks to the working 
class organisation„ "In a Gallup Poll (1956) roughly one out of every three clerks 
who were interviewed on the causes of recent strikes and on the policy of the govern« 
meat should take in this situation gave answers which clearly densonstrated their 
conception of the working class and trade unionism as a threatening and dangerous 
force which should be repressed," The Blackcoated Worker, London, 104, Footnote 2„ 
Lockwf?:>d's entire chapter m  the status problems of the British white collar workers 
contains many useful insights into status politics of the lower middle class in 
England» In his autobiography Ernst Wigforss, a Swedish socialist politician, gives 
excerpts from a letter containing a vivid eyewitness account of a raseting at which 
the rev«, Stöcker a prominent leader in the pra World War X aneisemitic movement in 
SerHsanv apoke„ Stacker's speech blaming the Jews and the labor movement for all 
evils had a strong appeal among some lower middle class elementsf. (Ernst Wigforss, 
Minnen, 1914-1932, vol„ II, Stockholm 1951, 27f.,)־
It a person experiences deprivation associated with his present status then the 
more stronger has expectation is {־.hat he himelf .will h® able to move t& a 
hiahe־¿ status with less deprivation-, the less likely he is to combine with 
others r.o remove the cause a of dep rivation ia his present status.
So if it is the case that the bulk of American white collar workers 
especially those in the younger groups, expect to be potentially mobile into 
higher statuses (or for women to expect their jobs to be temporary) then there is 
little basis for a vigorous union movement. A consequence of this is that a rank 
Inconsistent middle-aged person who no longer aspects to be eoblle will find it 
hard to choose response b.
Among European white collar workers, on the other hand, individual mobility 
expectations are said to be less widespread and accenuated, Unions have conse­
quently caught hold among white collar workers in England, the Scandinavian 
countries and France to a larger extent than in the U«S. This line of thought has 
been put forth by Lipset and Bendix in their discussion of social mobility 
(Upset and Bendix, 1959)« They make a great deal of differences in values and 
beliefs about social mobility said to exist between. European countries and the 
U.S. although the actual differences in mobility rates between European countries 
and the O.S« are quite small. (This is Lipset's and Bendix' main thesis, but 
the data advanced to support it are far from satisfactory)«I
,,Thus, where, as in the United States, social mobility receives positive 
encouragement, the existing opportunities for upward mobility probably help to 
sustain the acceptance of the social and political order, by the lower classes.
But such opportunities probably cannot shake the distrust of the prevailing
order that exists among lower class persons in such countries as France, where 
the dominant historical image is one of an unfair distribution of opportunities, 
in which little mobility occurs»"
Lipset and Bendix point to several factors which in their view contribute 
to the maintenance of widespread mobility expectations among Americans; The 
absence of a Feudal past, educational opportunities, the presence of successive
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saves ©f iraaiigraat minorities who have taken over' such of the manual labor from 
those that arrived at an earlier tisae and whs» are not assimilating into African 
society. A substantial increase in the standard of living has also benefited 
these immigrants who remained lm* class and their children¡, especially compared 
to the conditions they used to live under in the countries of origin.
Also, whether a rightist or a leftist response will occur in a rank incon­
sistent situation will depend on the cultural tnodes of thinking available in the 
milieu of the actor. If, as seems to be the .case with parts of the American 
middle class.» rightist modes of thinking, expressed in suspicion of the central 
government, vague fears of Socialism, admiration for the tough self-made man and 
so on, permeate the milieu of an individual, he will be more likely to select a 
rightist than a leftist response־ Also, if strong external "enemy"lik« the 
Soviet Union in a way is identified with some of the symbols of leftism, such as 
socialism, state control and so on, then these symbols will take on an even more 
odious quality־ It goes without saying that It is hard to get Information about 
some of the individual’s perceptions of these factors using conventional survey 
research methods ־
Let us now summarize the main arguments presented so far,
1״ From the three examples discussed it should be clear that a. rank incon 
slatency does not invariably produce a political response and b. that if a political 
response occurs it can be rightist or leftist or take the form of political 
apathy depending on certain cot very well undersood conditions,
2. We know little, if anything, about the factors governing which rank people 
will focus attention on. Also, we have assumed that Ego’s choice of which rank he 
will focus attention on takes place in a situation where the alternatives are 
mutually exclusive, ?hat is, if Ego focuses attention on Rank 1 then it follows 
that he does not focus on Rank 2 &r that particular time. However, it ¡my well be
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that Ego at one time focuses on Rank 1 and at some later time focuses 
on Rank 2. Oscillations between différent ranks over time are definitely possible, 
and this will possibly have interesting psychological consequences, Dors it lead 
to sentiments of ambivalence toward, let as say, Ego's Ethnic group if he alter־* 
nately tells himself that "for a (Jew, Segro...) I'm doing quite well" and "why, 
if I make as much raoaey as Alter deee he rebuff me?"
3. The theory remains rather indeterminât ! with respect to the response 
process following the occurrence of relative deprivation. For instance in 
case two above we list three possible results of feelings of relative deprivation 
on the part of Ego’s with low Ethnic rank, but we know little about the deter­
minants of the choice between these alternatives »
3־ Cp Soma Political Consequences of Social Mobility
Social mobility leads to discrepancies between ascribed and achieved ranks 
or between two achieved ranks held at the same or at two different points in time,
A certain amount of empirical research has been done into the effects of mobility 
on political attitudes and status politics conceptions have been used to explain 
results in some cases, Soaft of the findings, we believe can be explained by the 
theory of rank equilibration, but it is also clear that this is by no means the 
only process operating.
Downward mobility. Let £g־j he downwardly mobile, having been born in a family whose 
head had an occupation with more prestige than that of Ego. Ego hxmself has a low 
prestige occupation. If Ego compares himself with an Alter he used to know as a 
child whose parents had high prestig« occupations and who themselves also have high 
prestige occupations, then he is likely to feel relatively deprived, The sai&r. will 
happen if Eg& compares himself with an Alter whose father had a low prestige occu 
yation but who himself has a high prestige one.
Another, but similar, situation arises if Ego’s occupational career has taken
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him down in the occupational hierarchy, let us say from a white collar to a 
working class occupation. If Ego compares his present rank with that he previously 
held he may feel relatively deprived. R. L. Wilensky who has studied the attitudes 
of downwardly mobile persons ("skidders") to the stratification order (Wilensky 
and Edwards, 1959) refers to such persons as ,,intrageneratioual skidders־"
Wilensky and Edwards find that the skidders compared with other workers are 
more mobility oriented, both for themselves and for their children. Skidders are 
more likely to see the stratification system as relatively open, are more likely 
to identify themselves as middle class rather than working class, and are less 
in favor of labor unions. These attitudes are characterized as "conservative." 
However, at least one other American survey reports that downwardly mobile persons 
take on some of the attitudes of the class they move into. Eleanor Maccoby and her 
associates found that on questions dealing with whether the respondents side with the 
workers or with management in strikes, the downwardly mobile said that they side 
with the workers about as often as non-mobile members of the working class did. But 
in the same study it was also found that the downwardly mobile were more likely to 
prefer Eisenhower over Stevenson than both the non-mobiles in the class they came 
from the non-mobiles in the class they had moved into־ (Maccoby et al., 1954). 
Strictly speaking there is no contradiction between these findings, the data 
came from surveys conducted at different tines at different places. Still the 
data cast some doubt on the existence of any "automatic“ tending for skidders to be 
conservative.
Can we interpret these findings using the rank equilibration theory? We 
assume that the skidder will attempt mobility in order to regain his former rank, 
either for himself, or for his children. Rut if mobility is blocked then one re­
sponse available for the skidder who feels relatively deprived ie to cling to the 
vestiges of his former rank, by refusing to become working class in politics and/or
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way of life. This enables the skidder to nay to himself that he is "not really" 
a worker. In order to show that thi3 actually takes place, we would need data about 
Ego's perceptions and behaviorism in a variety of areas, including, of course, 
politics, leisure, styles of residence and so on. If rank saving were the only pro­
cess operating, then we would expect to find that there is little difference between 
the skidder and the stratum he originally came from on these matters, especially 
if income can be held constant. We might even expect to find that in some areas, 
which it makes little difference how much money an individual has, like political 
opinions, the skidder would be even more conservative than the stratum he originally 
came from. In order to emphasize the difference between the regular workers and 
himself, a downwardly mobile person becomes middle class "with a vengeance." Some­
thing of this sort is, wa recall, found in Kaccoby's study in the preferences for 
Eisenhov?er vs. Stevenson. In the same study, however, the skidders were found to 
resemble the non-mobile workers more than the class they originated in at least one 
attitude dimension. Also, in a Swedish study it was found that the skidders in po­
litical preferences lie between the non-mobile workers and non-mobile middle class. 
(Anderson, 1963). This means that at least some of the downwardly mobiles are con­
forming to the modal norms of the working class. This is to say, that while there 
may be some skidders who hang on to the middle class political attitudes as vestiges 
of their former ranks, there is also a socialisation process operating which tends 
to make the skidder take on the attitudes on the stratum that he has moved into.
In trying to analyze survey data about the behavior of mobiles using rank 
theory it should also be remembered that there are downwardly mobile persons who 
compare their own rank with that of other (non-mobile) workers. According to the 
theory these people should not get particularly upset. It may also be that some 
skidders are making more money as workers than they used to make in white collar jobs
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or that their father's made. So much of the survey data we have examined are 
theoretically uninterpretable since they do not shoxo with whom the skidders compare 
themselves and how they look upon and react to the rank discrepancies discovered 
in the comparisons.
Upward Mobility. Upward mobility has already been referred to in the discussion of 
the response called "passing" in section 1. Passing is mobility along the ethni­
city rank dimension. But upward mobility most often refers to movement from one 
occupational prestige class to a higher one, either within the life history of one 
individual or between two generations of a family. Upward mobility is sometimes said 
to cause status anxiety. (Bell, 1962, ch.6) This anxiety can get generated 
through a rebuff process. Assume that Ego is socially mobile, and now occupies 
a high occupational rank. If he tries to associate with a non-mobile person of 
the same occupational rank and gets rebuffed and sees this due to, say, speech patter 
or soma other quality associated with his former low rank, he will presumably get 
upset and most likely try to obliterate the signs of the former status. Antici­
pation of rebuff may conceivably have the same effects־ This leads to rigid 
"overconformity" with the norms of the new occupational stratum. Political con­
formity may be one symptom of this tendency. Therefore, upwardly mobile middle 
class groups will be non-Democrats at least as often as non-mobile members of the 
stratum they have moved into.
This line of thought clearly presupposes a number of things: a. Democratic 
inclinations will be perceived os a sign of low rank in Ego's new social stratum 
and/or that Ego believes this to be the caee; b. political attitudes are visible 
enough so tha t others will detect that Ego is a political non-conformist if he 
remains a Democrat (in U.S.); c. the other members of the new stratum will react 
negatively to this; and d. Ego's political attitudes are either weak or he cares 
little enough about them so that they will change under the amount of social 
pressures that the new stratum extends.
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The evidence available in the empirical literature, based on survey research 
indifferent countries, to test the prediction is quite contradictory. In the 
U.S., Eleanor Maccoby (Maccoby, 1954) found that the upwardly mobile preferred 
Eisenhower over Stevenson to a greater extent than the non-mobile members of 
their new stratum. On the other hand they were more likely to say tha t they were 
Democrats or had Democratic leanings than the non-mobiles in their new stratum. 
Maccoby's sample consisted of young people, and it is conceivable that the effects 
of mobility on their attitudes had not run their course yet. Still for the U.S., 
Lipset and Bendix report data from a survey conducted in 1952 that show that of 
American middle class men, those whose fathers were manual workers were Demo­
crats less often than those whose fathers were middle clas3 or farmers (Lipset 
and Bendix, 1959, 67). Key presents soma data from another Michigan survey showing 
that there is virtually no difference between upwardly mobile and stationary 
white collar people on attitudes toward Donestle Welfare Activities. (Key, 1961 
146). Upwardly mobile workers, on the other hand, turned out to be somewhat 
more in favor of such activities, and hence more liberal, than stationary 
workers« Upwardly mobile Europeans are more often radical (Social Democrats or 
Communists) than the non-mobile members of their new stratum, but less often 
radical than the working class they come from. (Lipset and Bendix, 1959,
Anderson, 1963).
In evaluating these conflicting results it should be remembered that we can
expect conformity only assuming the conditions a-c listed above. Many mobile 
persons presumably do not experience or anticipate rebuff for not being Democrats 
(in U.S.) or Socialists (in Europe). It would be interesting to specify the cir­
cumstances under which such rebuff is likely to occur, but that is outside of the 
scope of this paper. The surveys we have referred to do not contain any infor­
mation on this question. We suspect that if conformity or, for that matter, 
resentment due to rebuff or anticipated rebuff would be hard to diagnose with the
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conventional survey interview. These motivations make people defensive and thay 
often operate on a subconscious or only partially conscious level. Thus the data 
on the effects of mobility in political orientations have a rather loose connection 
with the theory of rank equilibration as we have stated it.
It should also be retEeaibered that there are other processes which may cancel 
out some or all of the effects of status anxiety, Some upwardly mobile people 
will feel so strongly about leftist political views that they will not change 
e\'en when under social pressures to do 3 0 . Many of them will also have contacts 
with the milieu they came from and get influenced by them. Others will move up 
into strata such as the Academic World in which a Democratic party choice is 
very common. And some will not try to atrophy the signs of their previous rank 
at all but will acknowledge their low class origin, and use their rank to further 
the interests of that class. There are also the autonomous individuals, rarely 
dealt with in studies of political behavior, who maintain certain convictions 
because rational reasoning has convinced them that they follow from the facts or 
because they seem to be implied by some general value commitments they take 
seriously. For these people convictions may be quite contrary to their "objective" 
class interests or even to their first "gut reactions" to some question of 
political controversy. The processes involved here have essentially to do with 
socialization end the choice and maintenance of reference groups, and they are, 
needless to say, only partly underetood. It is clear, however, that no serious 
research into the effects of mobility on politics can ignore them. A discrimina­
ting "clinical" interview searching for the ,,meanings" which the rank dimensions 
and symbols attached to these have for different upwardly and downwardly mobile 
persons might conceivably enable us to infer something about the interplay of 
the processes we have discussed, but the standard survey procedure is clearly
inadequate.
page 18
3 ־ Soaie cases from his gory״
Some historians have found the conceptions of status politics useful 
in constructing explanations. Writers on the situation of the Bourgeoisie 
in pre-revolutionary France have pointed out how the well-to-do merchants, 
manufacturers and other members of the middle classes failed to get social 
recognition corresponding to their wealth, and how this made them turn against 
the old social order, (See C, Brinton, 1957; E. Barber, 1955; Le׳. Fevbre, 1957) .
The adjustment o£ the guilded artisans to rapid industrialization should also 
provide a fruitful area for the study of the political consequences of downward 
¡nobility. In a study of the early Trade Unions movement in Sweden it is shown 
rapid urbanization during the 1870,s and 1880‘s lead to a rapid influx of un­
skilled workers into the cities. These migrants were willing to work for lower 
wages than those that had bean common for the journeymen in the cities. '4This 
led to competition for work among the workers, which increased as urbanization 
progressed. The piece rate system became more and more used which created 
further inequalities in income.... Finally, the migrants had usually not had 
the same thorough training in the trade that the journeymen had and this created 
discontent among the skilled journeymen.’' Comparing themselves with the unskilled 
migrants, then, the journeymen could sometimes discover that they got less or 
the same pay, which led to feelings of relative deprivation. By creating organi­
zations the skilled workers tried to bar competition from the unskilled migrants 
and to promote the interests of skilled workers.
It should be remembered, again, that factors like rank concerns are not 
sufficient conditions for the emergence of a social movement among the relatively 
deprived. For instance, if the discontented were scattered and isolated from
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one another no movement would result־ It has been noted that the segregated
working class neighborhoods in Europe facilitated the growth of the union
Xand socialist movements. During the revolution of 1848 there occurred in­
stances of artisans destroying machines ■which they feared would make them 
superfluous. (See, for instance, L.B. Namier,1948 ). Here we shall discuss 
briefly two cases, the role of the British gentry in the revolution of 1640 
and the rise of the Progressive Movement in the United States at the begin­
ning of the present century.
3.1. The British gentx^y and the revolution of 1640.
During the last twenty years there has been a great deal of discussion 
among 3ritish historians about the role of the gentry in the English revolution 
of 1640. R. H. Tawney (1941, 1954) interpreted the revolution as a struggle 
for political power between a rising gentry class and the declining court 
nobility. Against this interpretation Trevor-Roper has tried to show that 
the gentry in fact did not improve its economic position between 1540 and 1640 
but rather declined. The rebellion, then, is seen by Trevor-Roper as an 
attempt by the declining gentry to overthrow these parts of the social structure 
which were seen as the causes of their declining economic status (Trevor-Roper, 
1953, 1957; Expec. 27-29). Trevor Soper’s theory has a number of similarities 
with attempts by historians to explain other radical political changes, for 
instance with Hofstadter’s interpretation of the rise of the American Progressive
Tage Lindbom, Den Svenska FackftjreningsrBrelsens Uppkoms.t, (Stockholm, 1938), 
40f. Translated from the Swedish.
See Robert Michels, "Zur Psychologic der Anti-Kapitalistischen Massenbewegungen 
Grundriss der Sozial8konomic, vol. XX, 247 ff.s also Gregor Paulsson, Svensk Stad 
Vol. 1, Stockholm, 1950.
movement prior to the First World War and with one standard interpretation 
of the rise to power of the Nanis in Germany.
The discussion between Tawney and Trevor-Roper centers partly around 
the question of how one assesses changes in the economic situation of the 
gentry during the hundored years before the revolution. They agree that there 
was a substantial price and cost inflation during the period. The value of 
money went down with a factor of 2/3. At the same time, the crown demanded 
Increased dues especially during the reign of James I. There were several 
ways in which members of the landed gentry tried to compensate for their 
loss of income due to the inflation and the increased levies.
1. They could increase the rents and other du«3 paid by their tenants. 
This was done and in 3cme places produced unrest among the poorer classes.
A peasants rebellion broke out in Midland in 1607, and radical demands for 
political change known as the "digger" movements grew up in response to the 
attempts of the gentry to raise dues and rents.
2. The gentry could rationalise their agricultural methods. Tawney 
oeiieves that this was an important factor in the rise of the gentry that he 
thinks took place. (Tawney^ 1941).
3. A landed gentleman who found that his income was declining could 
try to obtain an office from the king. This was done to considerable extent, 
but it became increasingly difficult, since there were not enough offices to 
go around, and because those who managed to get offices often were successful 
in malting these hereditary.
4. Privateering against the Spanish colonies and shipping in the West 
Indies was a source of income for a gentleman who could equip a ship. This
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avenue was blocked, however, when James X. concluded a peace treaty with Spain, 
ending a long period of warfare between England and that country.
During the period a great deal of land which formerly belonged to the 
Church passed into the hands of the gentry. But during the reign of James I 
the crown began to protect the land rights of the Church, so that this way 
of increasing their economic status became blocked for the gentry.
Our theory now leads us to pose two separate questions:
A. The first of these questions is: Was there, on the average, a rise 
or decline in absolute terms in the economic standing of the gentry between 
1540 and 1640 or was there may be no change at all? To answer this question 
we would have to instruct an index of income for representative eamples of 
the landed gentry over the period. Into this index would go the incomes 
from land holdings as well as from the other sources 1-5 above. The suras 
would have to be adjusted for depreciation due to the inflation trend. Given 
this information one could then study variations in economic standing within 
the gentry class over given periods. For instance, even if there were a slight 
average risa of income there could still be large groups of landed property 
holders who did not benefit from the over-all improvement and among whom dis­
content with the political order could breed. The historians have ¿־ecognized 
that there is a need for making distinctions between different parts of the 
gantry class: much of the discussion deals with the question of what happened 
to the gentry as a whole but Trevor-Roper’s hypothesis about the causes of the 
revoluation really deals with the role of the "backward rural gentry," and he 
recognises that there were other gentry groups who did not support or x?ere 
opposed to the revolution.
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B. The second question is: Hew did the gentry or parts of the gentry 
do economically in comparison with other social strata they might have been 
comparing themselves with?
As we have said earlier in this paper, comparisons with other groups 
may very well create unrest among a stratum quite independently of hot•; the 
stratum has fared in absolute economic or other respects. Thus, regardless of 
whether some portion of the gentry rose or declined in absolute income, discontent 
may have arisen if this group itself were doing less well over time than some 
other *,relevant" reference groups, may be, including some other part of the 
gentry itself» There are some indications in Trevor-Roper's analysis that he 
is aware of the importance of the comparison process. He points out the fact 
that gentry holdings, especially in the counties near London were bought up 
by persons connected with the merchantile world of London. In terms of our 
theory, this may have "forced comparisons1' between the gentry and these 
newcomers.... And it seems to be clear that the revolutionaries directed their 
resentment: as much against the cotmoerical interests in London as again3t the 
court and the cavaliers. If it is hard to evaluate the data proposed to settle 
the question about the absolute rise or decline of the gentry or parts thereof, 
it would, presumably, be even harder to get data about with which groups par­
ticular parts of the gentry compared their own economic and social standing.
In Trevor-Roper,s discussion of the cooing of the rebellion there are 
some points about the effects of discontent. He states that the gentry discontent 
was merely "social tinder" and that some factors had to be present in order to 
ignite this tinder. Some discontented groups were Catholic, and not having access 
to any institutional means for expressing their desire for change, they resorted
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to plots like the Gunpower Plot. The Puritan British gentry worked through 
Parliament for changes and violence broke out due to the irreconciliatory 
attitudes of King Charles and Strafford.
According to Trevor-Roper, then, the revolution of 1640 was a "rightist" 
revolt, and the revolutionaries had a political program which has some remar­
kable similarities with right-wing programs in our own tin«». The centralization 
of the political and commercial affairs of the country to London was to be 
abolished. An adventurous and expansion!Stic foreign policy was advocated and 
pursued. The past Elizabethian Age was glorified. (Trevor-Roper, 1957, 187,
201 f). This tendency to glorify the past is inherent in much "right-wing" 
ideology, and glorification of the past may, as Max Scheler tried to show in 
his classic book, be one expression of deep Ressentiment due to blocked ambi­
tions in the present. (Scheler, 1961, 68).
There are a few points in Trevor-Roper's theory of the British revolution 
that would merit soise further exploration in the light of our theory. First, 
Trevor-Roper says that the revolutionary gentry essentially failed to accomplish 
its ends and that the Restoration policies were essentially continuations of 
the pre-1640 conditions. The gentry, however, lapsed into quietism and con­
servatism after the Restoration. If the causes that created the discontent 
were still there, how did the quietism come about? How did the radical gentry 
become "the royalist ,young squires' of the Convention and Cavalier Parliaments, 
the squires of the October Club, the high-flying non-resisting tories"? (Trevor- 
Roper, 1953, 43). Trevor-Roper says that ,,all they gained by the revolution 
was, in the end, another court, other office-holders, other great financiers, 
heavier taxes־" If the revolution proved to be a futile way of tackling the
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very real problecis of the gentry, did they attempt any other solutions to them?
Second, Trevor-Roper says that the situation of the British gentry was 
similar to that of the corresponding strata in France. (Trevor-Roper, 1953, 52). 
What, then, was the response of the gentilhoames? Why did no gentry revolution 
occur in France? And what was the substitute for a revolution in that country?
3.2 The case of the American progressive tcovegent.
Kofstadter has used a "status politics" hypothesis to account for some 
tendencies in modern American history. In discussing the rise of the Progres­
siva Movement during the decades prior to World War I, he points out that 
this movement was carried primarily by people of middle class status or higher.
He first discusses the role of the old American wealthy families. These people, 
being used to having power and influence in local communities or in higher 
branches of civic life found themselves ousted from their positions by nouveaux 
riches business leaders connected with the emerging big corporations. The 
fortunes and incomes of the old elite were insignificant compared with those 
of the newly rich. Some resentment against the corporation elite developed 
among the old elite. At first this resentment was rather insulated, the "Mug­
wumps" had too little contact with the radical mass movements because of their 
political conservatism, adherence to laissez faire economics. The second gen­
eration of Mugwumps, says Kofstadter, largely abandoned this conservatism, and 
championed moderately radical ideas for social change, such as anti-trust 
legislation. (Kofstadter, 1955, 131 ff). The Progressive Movement was, then 
according to Kofstadter, partly an attempt by the old elites to curb the new 
plutocracy. Kofstadter does not really present any strict documentation for 
this thesis, however. The theory of rank equilibration predicts that, for
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instance, if: Ego as a member of an old wealthy family compared himself with 
the corporate plutocracy and jLf in doing so he focused attention on his own 
wealth and power compared to that of the corporate magnates, then he would 
be likely to feel Res sentiment. Given this we can predict that there was 
a chance that he would try to act politically in order to curb the power 
and the wealth of the newly rich. However, in comparing himself with the 
nouveaux riches Ego might instead have chosen to emphasise his lineage and 
the fact that his wealth was old» Or he might have chosen to ignore the 
newly rich altogether. As we have said before, we do not yet know much about 
how the comparisons of ranks come about, nor about how a choice is made 
between the several possible reactions to Ressentiment.
Thus we find again that the connections between the theory as it stands 
and complex political phenomena in the ’,real world" are somewhat tenuous.
That the rank equilibration theory used with caution capable of illu­
minating some aspects of the political process seems very likely, however, 
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